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Evaluating the demand for aquaculture insurance: an investigation of fish 
farmers’ willingness to pay in central coastal areas in China
Abstract Despite the remarkable development in its fishery sector, the penetration rate of fishery 
insurance in China is considerably low. This paper examines the key factors that contribute to the 
poor performance of fishery insurance, in particular aquaculture insurance, in China. The double-
bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation method (DB DCCVM) is used to investigate 
fish farmers' willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance, based on a survey of 1,280 fish farmers in 
three coastal cities in China. The results indicate that fish farmers' decisions on adoption of an 
insurance scheme depend on various factors, among which magnitude of financial loss, fish 
farmers' awareness toward insurance and their education all have a positive effect on the WTP. 
However, household income and farming experience are found to have a negative effect. 
Furthermore, the mean WTP for aquaculture insurance is estimated to be CNY579 (US$90.05)1 
per household, which is equivalent to 1.5% of mean annual household income. These results 
provide several policy implications for the Chinese government, insurance companies as well as 
researchers.
Keywords China, fishery insurance, aquaculture insurance, willingness to pay (WTP), double-
bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation method (DB DCCVM)
JEL Classification Codes Q22, H42
1 The exchange rate of 1 US Dollar to Chinese Yuan was 6.43 on 18th June 2018 from Bank of China.
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1Evaluating the demand for aquaculture insurance: an investigation of fish farmers' 
willingness to pay in central coastal areas in China
Abstract Despite the remarkable development in its fishery sector, the penetration rate of fishery insurance 
in China is considerably low. This paper examines the key factors that contribute to the poor performance 
of fishery insurance, in particular aquaculture insurance, in China. The double-bounded dichotomous 
choice contingent valuation method (DB DCCVM) is used to investigate fish farmers' willingness to pay 
(WTP) for insurance, based on a survey of 1,280 fish farmers in three coastal cities in China. The results 
indicate that fish farmers' decisions on adoption of an insurance scheme depend on various factors, among 
which magnitude of financial loss, fish farmers' awareness toward insurance and their education all have a 
positive effect on the WTP. However, household income and farming experience are found to have a 
negative effect. Furthermore, the mean WTP for aquaculture insurance is estimated to be CNY579 
(US$90.05)1 per household, which is equivalent to 1.5% of mean annual household income. These results 
provide several policy implications for the Chinese government, insurance companies as well as 
researchers.
Keywords China, fishery insurance, aquaculture insurance, willingness to pay (WTP), double-bounded 
dichotomous choice contingent valuation method (DB DCCVM)
JEL Classification Codes Q22, H42
1. Introduction
Fisheries and aquaculture are one of the most important sources of income for millions of people 
around the world. The most recent estimates from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2016) 
indicate that 56.6 million people across the world were engaged in the primary sector of fisheries and 
aquaculture in 2014. Of this total population, 25 percent (approximately 14 million people) were in China 
engaged as fishermen and fish farmers. Over the past decades China's fishery industry has achieved 
remarkable development. China represents more than 60% of the world aquaculture production and has 
remained the major producer for marine fisheries production followed by Indonesia, the United States and 
Russia (FAO, 2016). In 2016 the total value of production in fisheries was CNY1,200 billion (US$186.63 
billion) (China Fishery Statistical Year Book 中国渔业统计年鉴 , 2017), contributing to approximately 
1 The exchange rate of 1 US Dollar to Chinese Yuan was 6.43 on 18th June 2018 from Bank of China.
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21.6% of the nation's GDP.2
The fishery sector is broadly divided into capture fishery and aquaculture, both of which are highly 
dependent on resources and climate and therefore are of high risk. The risks in capture fishery include 
typhoon, technical failure and accident as well as loss of life and injury on board. In aquaculture there are 
several factors that can cause production loss and facilities damage such as natural disasters, technical 
failure, extreme weather and environmental pollution (Yuan et al., 2017). In 2016, various risks caused a 
total economic loss to fishery and aquaculture in China of approximately CNY28.8 billion (US$4.48 
billion) and the number of the dead, missing and seriously injured people was 165 (China Fishery 
Statistical Year Book 中国渔业统计年鉴, 2017).
Insurance mechanisms have been widely used in agriculture for risk management as an effective 
means to mitigate financial risks and to reduce negative impacts of natural catastrophes. An average of 30% 
of global economic loss from natural disasters is compensated by insurance. The rate is much higher (50% 
to 60%) in the developed countries such as the US and Canada, but considerably lower (less than 2%) in 
China (SIGMA, 2017). Artemis (2016) reported that most of China's US$41 billion of catastrophic 
economic losses in 2015 were uninsured and concluded that insurance penetration had not kept pace with 
the rapidly growing economy. As an important part of agriculture insurance system, fishery insurance in 
China is still under developed, despite reports of substantial damage and losses every year. For instance, in 
2013, although 988,500 fishermen and fish farmers were insured through China Fishery Mutual Insurance 
Association (CFMI, 中国渔业互保协会), they accounted for only 12.5% of the total number of people 
engaged in the sector. In the same year, the total premium income of fishery insurance was CNY1.44 
billion (US$224 million), less than 5% of the total premium volume of agriculture insurance in China (Guo 
et al., 2015).
A fishery insurance program in China was initiated in 1982 by the People's Insurance Company of 
China (PICC, 中国人民保险公司) as part of the company's agriculture insurance services. The scheme 
was on a small scale and only covered loss of life and injury from accident and damage to fishing vessels. 
The PICC did not insure aquaculture until 1995 when a pilot scale was undertaken to cover only 2% of the 
total aquaculture area in China (Yuan et al., 2017). In spite of continuous support from central and local 
2 China's GDP was CNY74,413 billion (US$11,572 billion) in 2016 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 国
家统计局, 2017).
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3governments to develop fishery insurance programs in the past decades, the penetration rate of aquaculture 
insurance remains low. This is partially because the lack of underwriting profitability has compelled some 
insurers to pull out of insuring aquaculture livestock due to the nature of business. The difficulty arises 
from determining damage and loss as well as structuring premiums in absence of accurate statistical data. 
There has been an increasing number of studies that attempt to explore specific means of insurance against 
aquaculture risks. However, to our best knowledge, very few have examined the factors from fish farmers' 
perspective and investigate what influences their decisions on adoption of aquaculture insurance. In 
particular, there is no such a research that has been undertaken to reveal fish farmers' actual willingness to 
pay (WTP) for aquaculture insurance in China and address the barriers to insurance adoption in coastal 
areas where aquaculture plays an important role in the local economy. 
Therefore, this paper is focused on investigating fish farmers' WTP for aquaculture insurance and 
aims to identify the key factors associated with poor adoption of aquaculture insurance in three coastal 
cities in China based on a survey of 1,280 fish farmers. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides the background and the current status of China's fishery insurance in general, followed by a 
review of related literature in Section 3. Section 4 establishes the theoretical framework and basic 
assumptions. Then, data collection and methodology are explained in Section 5. In Section 6 the 
descriptive statistics and empirical results are presented and discussed. Section 7 concludes the paper with 
policy implications and recommendations.
2. Overview of fishery insurance in China
A fishery insurance program in China was initially provided in 1982 by the People's Insurance 
Company of China (PICC, 中国人民保险公司) as part of the company's agriculture insurance services. 
Since then fishery insurance has gone through a series of continual adjustments in terms of both programs 
and practices.
2.1 Evolution of operational mode of fishery insurance
A fishery insurance program in China started in accordance with the commercial insurance 
operational mode and was initially monopolized by the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC, 中国
人民保险公司). In 1985 several other insurance companies entered the market, such as China Ping An 
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4Insurance (Group) Company Ltd. (中国平安保险 (集团) 股份有限公司), China Life Insurance Company 
Ltd. (中国人寿保险股份有限公司 ) and a few foreign commercial insurance companies. However, 
confronting with diverse sources of uncertainty and high level of risks associated with fishery and 
aquaculture, commercial insurance companies were reluctant to get involved in this sector, particularly, in 
small-scale fisheries and fish-farming activities. In the 1990s, financial loss resulting from operating these 
insurance businesses became particularly severe due to the lack of policy support from the government. As 
fishery and aquaculture proved itself to be an expensive class of insurance to handle, most commercial 
insurance companies pulled out, leaving the PICC alone offering a very limited range of services such as 
employers' liability insurance and large fishing boat insurance. 
In 1995, the PICC began to insure aquaculture on a pilot scale and received a total premium income 
of CNY9.3 million (US$1.45 million). Nonetheless, the indemnity paid was CNY18.3 million (US$2.85 
million), which made the loss ratio3 of almost 200 percent (Ge and Lou, 1997). As a result of such a huge 
loss, insurance for aquaculture was ceased in 1996 following high occurrence of disasters abetted by poor 
farming management. The pilot commercial insurance program for aquaculture was thus deemed 
unsuccessful. In the meantime, China Fishing Boat Owners Mutual Insurance Association (中国渔船船东
互保协会 ) was established in July 1994. It was then renamed as China Fishery Mutual Insurance 
Association (CFMI, 中国渔业互保协会) in October 2007. CFMI aims to help share risks between the 
owners of fishing vessels, fishermen and fish farmers as well as associated stakeholders. It is a nonprofit 
organization and regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MOA, 中华人民共和国农业
农村部 ). Owners of fishing vessels can join it on a voluntary basis.4 This business model effectively 
helped to alleviate conflicts of interest between commercial insurance companies and the insured.5 Over 
the last decade, fishery mutual insurance has gradually replaced commercial insurance and become the 
primary operational mode of fishery insurance in China. Between 1994 and 2012, CFMI insured more than 
5.57 million fishermen and 350,000 fishing vessels (China Fisheries Association 中国渔业协会, 2013).  In 
3 Loss ratio is the proportion of indemnity paid to premium earned by the insurer.
4 CFMI's headquarter is in Beijing with nine provincial associations and 30 offices in various provinces.
5 Mutual insurance by definition is owned entirely by their policyholders. Any profits earned are returned to 
policyholders in the form of dividend distributions or reduced future premiums. It is different from stock 
insurance, which, on the other hand, is owned by their shareholders and therefore strive to maximize 
shareholders' value. 
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52012, CFMI initiated a pilot insurance program for aquaculture in partnership with commercial insurance 
companies as well as aquaculture cooperatives and associations. In that year the aquaculture area under the 
insurance program was around 80,000 mu,6 which is less than 1% of China's total aquaculture area (Qin 
and Zhai, 2015).
Since 2008, there has been increasing financial support for fishery insurance provided by central and 
local governments at various levels. More commercial insurance companies started to enter the market. 
Thus the fishery sector in China is currently operated in both mutual and commercial modes. 
2.2 Policy support from central and local governments
In order to expand the coverage of fishery insurance, in 2008, the MOA issued "The notice regarding 
the pilot project of central government's premium subsidies for fishery mutual insurance" (MOA, 2008). 
This project initiated a trial of subsidized insurance programs in some key fishing areas such as Shandong, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hainan, Liaoning and Fujian. Since then a special budget of approximately 
CNY100,000 (US$15,552) from central government has been injected annually into fishery insurance 
programs as direct financial support and subsidies.
In recent years local governments have been following central government’s suit to make a great 
effort in providing various subsidies:
 In 2012 "Implementation of Policy-Oriented Fishery Insurance in Guangdong Province" (GDOFA, 
2012) was published. It required local governments at provincial, municipal and county levels to provide 
35% or more subsidies to cover fishermen and fish farmers' personal accident insurance and fishing boat 
insurance.
 In the meantime, Zhejiang province issued "The Interim Measures for the Management of Special 
Funds for Subsidies for Fishery Mutual Insurance" (ZJCZT, 2012), which provided 20% premium 
subsidies for mutual insurance of fishing boat owners' liability and life insurance.
 In 2014 "The Notice of Implementing Scheme of Agriculture Insurance in Hainan Province" 
(DFHNP, 2017) was announced. It improved the coverage of fishermen’s personal accident insurance to 
CNY400,000 (US$62,208) and expanded financial subsidies for fishery mutual insurance to 60%. It 
further brought fishing boats insurance and fishermen's marine accidents insurance into financial subsidies 
in 2017.
6 1 mu is equal to 0.165 acres.
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6 On 27 November 2015 "Implementation Plan for Fishery Insurance Pilot in Dalian" (DLOFA, 
2015) was published, which marked the first time in Dalian aquaculture insurance started to be 
implemented.
 On 1 December 2015 "The Circular on Financial Subsidy Policy of Fishery Mutual Insurance in 
Tianjin" (TJCS, 2015) came into force. The circular stated that fishermen were entitled to receive premium 
subsidies up to 60% to cover fishing vessels and life insurance.
 On 6 April 2017 "The Notice of Strengthening Aquaculture Mutual Insurance Pilot in Zhejiang" 
(ZJOAF, 2017) was published. It stated that premiums could range from CNY22 to 200 per CNY10,000 
insurance value.
2.3 Types of insurance products against various risks
Fishery insurance can be generally categorized into three types: fishing vessel insurance; life 
insurance for fishermen and fish farmers; and aquaculture insurance. Most commercial insurance 
companies underwrite fishing vessel insurance and life insurance, such as China Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company Ltd. (中国平安保险 (集团) 股份有限公司), China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co. Ltd. (CPIC, 
中国太平洋保险 (集团) 股份有限公司), Tai Ping Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (太平人寿保险有限公司), and 
China Continent Insurance (中国大地财产保险股份有限公司). But very few commercial companies 
provide aquaculture insurance services. A brief summary of various types of insurance products is outlined 
in Table 1.
(Insert Table 1 here)
It can be noted from Table 1 that both CFMI and commercial insurance companies provide cover for 
damage to fishing vessels and loss of life, but very few companies cover indemnities for losses in 
aquaculture. It is also worth mentioning that many aquaculture insurance products are provided at regional 
level on a small scale. Moreover, the details of policies and liabilities are prone to change over time and 
entirely within discretion of local governments and insurance companies who provide the insurance.
3 Review of related literature
Insurance mechanisms have been widely used in agriculture to mitigate financial risks. The factors 
that affect agricultural output are often evident, such as weather, pest, disease outbreaks and etc. (Mumford 
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7et al., 2009). However, fishery industry, as an important sector of agriculture, distinguishes itself from 
more diverse sources of uncertainty and therefore has not been sufficiently covered by insurance policies. 
Fisheries involve a wide variety of uncertainties such as production, financial, market and institutional 
risks (Hardaker et al., 2004; Gray and Boehlje, 2005). For aquaculture in particular, with exposure to more 
uncertainties in catch, prices and revenue variations, insurance companies have less actuarial information 
on which to base risk assessments associated with production variables in fish farming. Consequently, to 
reduce operating risks, insurers are inclined to increase premiums which as a result may exceed fish 
farmers' willingness to pay and in turn further limit the coverage. 
As the world's top producer of aquatic products, China's low insurance coverage in aquaculture has 
attracted a lot of interest. There is a clear consensus in the literature that aquaculture insurance is 
inconsistent with the rapid development of the sector in China. The main reason is that aquaculture is an 
industry of high input and high risk. The difficulties in providing aquaculture insurance are mainly 
reflected in the following aspects: accurate statistical data is incomplete and financial loss is volatile, 
resulting in difficulties of setting premiums; the farming process has been dynamically changing and thus 
it is difficult to determine damage (Liu, 2013; Chen et al., 2016). Moreover, the strong technical 
characteristics of the aquaculture sector also make adverse selection and moral hazard far greater than any 
other commercial insurance (Sun, 2009; Wang and Li, 2013). All of these explain why the existing 
aquaculture insurance is operated on a small scale with rules and details of policies varying in regions.
A number of studies recommend adoption of policy-oriented insurance programs7 such as premium 
subsidies as a way forward towards enhancing coverage of aquaculture insurance in China (Sun, 2008; 
Long and Yang, 2009; Jin and Yang, 2010; Ye and Luo, 2011; Wang and Li, 2013; Chen et al., 2016). 
However, Mallory (2016) questioned whether China's insurance subsidies are aligned with the country's 
stated goals in fisheries management by examining China's fisheries policy coherence. She found that 
approximately 95% of Chinese fishery subsidies were harmful to sustainability. He (2015) analyzed 
subsidization trends and tracked the evolution of China's fishery policy objectives and priorities, which 
showed that historically the Chinese fishery sector had not been significantly subsidized in light of its 
relatively market-oriented structure. 
7 Under 'policy-oriented insurance programs', local governments are encouraged to provide premium subsidies 
and local mutual associations provide insurance services in collaboration with CFMI and insurance companies. 
Government policy also aims to reduce operational costs of insurance programs.
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8In addition to extensive research addressing the issues in fishery insurance in China, a few studies 
examined the factors influencing demand for fishery insurance. Ye (2010) analyzed demand and supply 
conditions of fishery insurance in China, and stated that risk level, income, premiums, insurance awareness 
and subsidies would all affect demand. Wu (2010) used the data from 130 fish farmers in Hubei province 
and identified the key factors influencing demand for the freshwater aquaculture insurance. Those factors 
are fish farmers' age, income, fishery species, and financial loss over the years. Jia and Cheng (2015) used 
the logit model to investigate the factors influencing demand for aquaculture insurance, concluding that 
fish farmers' age, income, previous losses, compensation and insurance knowledge were positively 
correlated with demand, but premiums exhibited an opposite correlation. However, all these studies do not 
distinguish between different types of fishery insurance, and none of them have attempted to estimate fish 
farmers' WTP, which is a key information for insurance companies and policy makers to understand in 
order to improve coverage of aquaculture insurance in China.
WTP is the amount of money an individual is willing to use in purchasing a product given a number 
of characteristics such as income, risk perception and level of risk aversion (Ali, 2013). The concept first 
appeared in economic literature more than a century ago and was designed to determine prices for pure 
public goods and services. Since people's perceptions and attitudes can influence their WTP, it is necessary 
to investigate their perceptions and attitudes in order to evaluate the real demand and set an affordable 
premium level. The WTP and factors that influence demand for agriculture insurance have been 
extensively studied (McCarthy, 2003; Choi et al., 2007; Hill et al., 2013; Gu and Lu, 2016). However, very 
little has been examined with regard to fish farmers' WTP and the issues of low insurance penetration in 
aquaculture. Some researchers have acknowledged poor performance of insurance in the fishing 
community. For example, Parappurathu et al. (2017) addressed the issues of fishery insurance in India and 
identified various factors that contributed to low coverage of fisheries insurance in the country. But they 
did not look into fish farmers' WTP and address the problem from their perspective. To our best 
knowledge, the only survey to estimate fishermen's WTP in an insurance program was undertaken in 
Oman in 2006 (Zekri et al., 2008), which involved 210 small-scale fishermen to estimate annual insurance 
premiums. 
4 Theoretical framework and basic assumptions
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9Aquaculture insurance, as one type of quasi-public goods, aims to provide insurance services for 
individuals earning a living from fish farming. According to the fundamental concepts of welfare 
economics and expected utility theory, utility maximization is a primary objective of policyholders, who 
are always risk averse. However, obtaining the maximized utility is subject to several factors that 
determine policyholders' WTP for aquaculture insurance. Based on the knowledge of the current status of 
aquaculture insurance in China and the existing literature, we proposed the following four hypothesis that 
can affect fish farmers' WTP.
Hypothesis 1: The low affordability of fish farmers for insurance limits their WTP. Small-scale 
decentralization is one of the outstanding characteristics of China's aquaculture sector. Most fish farmers 
are of low income with weak capacity to resist risks. This can limit their WTP and result in insufficient 
demand for aquaculture insurance.
Hypothesis 2: The large gap between the current government subsidies and the actual need of fish 
farmers does not help to raise the level of insurance coverage.
Fishery mutual insurance mainly relied on its own funding to expand business in absence of financial 
subsidies at its early stage. Since 2008, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (农业农村部) has 
allocated CNY10 million to mutual insurance associations to promote and strengthen mutual support for 
fishery insurance. Some local governments have also provided fishery mutual insurance subsidies. 
However, given the large population of fish farmers who are in great need for insurance but have weak 
purchasing power, the governments' financial subsidies are inadequate. 
Hypothesis 3: The unique characteristics of production in aquaculture sector make it very difficult to 
assess the insurability of various risks.
On the one hand, currently the dispersed small-scale production in aquaculture cannot provide 
accurate and reliable data with reference to diverse water quality, density of livestock, loss history and so 
on, which consequently affects insurance eligibility of some fish farmers. In addition, it becomes more 
problematic with calculation of stock, estimation of product value and inspection of accident losses. On the 
other hand, fearing of moral hazard, insurance companies tend to raise premiums in order to protect 
themselves against high risk and cover their high operating costs, which in turn discourages fish farmers 
from participating in insurance programs.
Hypothesis 4: Lack of awareness and understanding of insurance can be attributed to the causes of 
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10
fish farmers' resistance to aquaculture insurance.
As China's fishery insurance market in general is less developed, it does not have an established 
publicity mechanism for aquaculture insurance. With a relatively low level of education, most Chinese fish 
farmers are ignorant of insurance, particularly they lack the knowledge of aquaculture insurance. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that they resist purchasing unfamiliar insurance services for potential compensation.
5 Data sources and methodology
5.1 Study area and data collection
The extent and scope of marine natural risks vary across coastal regions from southeast to north in 
China. Shandong province is located in the Bohai Rim and rated at medium risk level in terms of marine 
disaster. It is a major agriculture production area, and in 2008 became one of the first pilot provinces for 
China's fishery insurance. The consumption per capita in Shandong is close to average among all coastal 
areas in China (NBS, 2017). At present there is no formal aquaculture insurance in Shandong province and 
thus this research is of high relevance in practice when aquaculture insurance policies are designed and 
structured. The specific study area for this research includes Qingdao, Yantai and Weihai in Shandong 
province. These three cities are typical aquaculture farming regions in Shandong province and have been 
suffering severe financial losses in aquaculture production every year. Figure 1 presents a map of China 
and location of the study area. 
 (Insert Figure 1 here)
The data used in this study were collected from a survey of 1,280 fish farmers who were randomly 
selected from the above mentioned three cities.8 
5.2 Key variables
 Table 4 (see Appendix) presents the key variables used to verify the hypothesis in the survey. 
Personal variables capture fish farmers' demographic information such as their age and farming experience. 
With the characteristics of small-scale and dispersed production, older fish farmers are deeply influenced 
by traditional working models and thus prefer to borrow money or to seek help from their relatives and 
8 The questionnaires were distributed to the fish farmers who were registered at local agricultural cooperatives 
and were able to be interviewed. Each respondent was informed of the survey aim, i.e. to investigate the 
willingness to pay for aquaculture insurance. It was also explained to them that the result of the survey would be 
only used to provide information for policy recommendation and not be used to inform actual prices.
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friends rather than to purchase insurance to cover the risk of financial loss. As they grow older and their 
farming experience accumulates, fish farmers' ability to respond to natural risks becomes stronger. 
Similarly in agriculture insurance both age and farming experience have also been found to impose a 
negative impact on policyholders' WTP (Spence et al., 2011; Bradford et al., 2012; Hill et al., 2013; 
Teshome and Bogale, 2015).
Social variables represent the basic characteristics of fish farmers' family, including household size, 
proportion of household members in labour force (including all types of employment in the household), 
and average annual household income. Household size is expected to have a negative impact on fish 
farmers' demand for insurance, because a bigger household needs more money to cover fixed expenditure 
and as a result little is left to be spent on insurance (Tian and Yao, 2015). The financial burden can be 
effectively alleviated if a high proportion of household members are in labour force and if the household 
receives a high income. This enables them to cope with natural disasters but meanwhile reduces their WTP 
for insurance (Bhutto and Bazmi, 2007). Some studies have also noted that fish farmers' demand for 
insurance has a significant correlation with their affordability of insurance premiums (Chien and Yeh, 
2009).
Risk variables reflect risk exposure by landholding per member of household and financial loss 
suffered by fish farmers in the previous years. Those who have suffered huge losses are keen to participate 
in insurance programs, but they may be incentivized to provide misleading information in order to receive 
a low premium. This can lead to the situation where those fish farmers with lower risks are squeezed out of 
the market.9
Attitude variables mainly focus on fish farmers' education and their awareness toward insurance. 
There exists a notable relationship between these two variables (Hill et al., 2013). It is widely accepted that 
the more educated people are, the more likely they are to take extensive and in-depth risk prevention 
measures (Burn, 1999; Choi et al., 2007; Seifert et al., 2013; Zhang and Stenger, 2014). Overall insurance 
awareness indirectly reflects fish farmers' knowledge of aquaculture insurance, thereby influencing their 
WTP (Azam et al., 2012; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012; Brunette et al., 2015; Qin et al., 2016). 
5.3 Analytical approach
There are many methods used to measure the WTP, based on either sales data or survey data. Since 
9 This is the case when moral hazard occurs.
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there is currently lack of existing sales data for aquaculture insurance in China due to the reasons explained 
earlier, fish farmers' WTP can be only elicited from survey data. It is worth noting that calculation of the 
WTP based on survey data may suffer from application or measurement problems. The hypothetical bias 
can appear when, placed in a hypothetical situation, particularly in the context of a questionnaire, the 
respondent does not consider all the constraints that would affect his choice in a real situation. Therefore, 
there is a difference between what the respondent says and what he could accept to pay in a real situation. 
A strategic bias can also arise when respondents deliberately formulate their answers to influence the 
outcome of the survey to further their own interests, which consequently can affect results (Le Gall-Ely, 
2009). However, despite the possible biased estimates due to the hypothetical data, the contingent 
valuation method (CVM) is still believed to be a practical alternative approach for estimating the WTP and 
hypothetical bias can be minimized or eliminated through a well-designed questionnaire (Carson, 2012).
In this study, the double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation method (DB DCCVM) 
was adopted to elicit fish farmers' WTP. The DB DCCVM model has been the most popular method of 
CVM due to its simplicity of use in data collection. It asks each respondent a sequence of two questions as 
to whether he or she would be willing to pay some specified amounts of money to obtain the non-marketed 
goods. The respondents required to answer YES or NO when asked if he/she is willing to pay a given 
amount (bid) for the good. In the DB DCCVM model the first question is followed by another specifying a 
lower amount, if the answer to the first question was negative and higher otherwise. Thus the DB DCCVM 
is more efficient than the single bounded model10 in solving poor choice of initial bids (Hanemann, 1991).  
We proposed five hypothetical premiums as initial bids in this research (see Table 2). The five starting bids 
(CNY50, CNY150, CNY250, CNY350, and CNY450 per household per year)11 were given randomly to 
each respondent in order to avoid starting-bid bias (Akter et al., 2011).
(Insert Table 2 here)
The outcomes of face-to-face survey fall into four categories:
 a. Accepting both the initial and the follow-up bids (YY)
 b. Accepting the initial bid but rejecting the follow-up bid (YN)
10 The single bound model comprises of only one such question for a respondent to answer YES or NO to a 
specified bid.
11 The five proposed starting bids are close approximation and fall in the range of actual premiums of those 
limited existing aquaculture insurance products (see Table 1). 
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 c. Rejecting the initial bid but accepting the follow-up bid (NY)
 d. Rejecting both the initial and the follow-up bids (NN)
The factors affecting the WTP were then analyzed by a double-bounded logit model as followsYi = αX1i + βX2i + εi             𝑖 = 1,⋯,n
Where  denotes fish farmer i's true willingness to pay for aquaculture insurance;  is a vector of Yi X1i
the selected variables;  is the ultimate bidding premium provided to fish farmer i;  is a random variable, X2i ε
including possibly unobservable characteristics influencing the final decision. So the specification of the 
equation isYi = α0 + α1Agei + α2Expi + α3Sizei + α4Proi + α5Inci + α6Landi + α7Lossi + α8Edui + α9AIni + α10CIni + βBidi
 i = 1,⋯,1,271
Where 
Agei= Fish farmer's age;
Expi= Farming experience, measured by years;
Sizei= Household size, measured by the number of people in households;
Proi= Proportion of household members in labour force;
Inci= Average annual household income, in CNY;
Landi= Landholding per member of household, in acres;
Lossi= Average annual loss of household, in CNY;
Edui= Discrete education level of the household held, measured by years;
AIni= Awareness towards aquaculture insurance;
CIni= Awareness towards other commercial insurance;
Bidi= the ultimate bidding premium provided to fish farmer i.
The responding probabilities are calculated for the double-bounded logit model (Hanemann, 1991).
                                                            (1)P𝑌𝑌𝑖 = 1/(1 + 𝑒 - (α + βHB))
                                                     (2)P𝑁𝑁𝑖 = 1 - 1/(1 + 𝑒 - (α + βLB))
                          (3)P𝑌𝑁𝑖 = 1/(1 + 𝑒 - (α + βHB)) - 1/(1 + 𝑒 - (α + βIB))
                           (4)P𝑁𝑌𝑖 = 1/(1 + 𝑒 - (α + βIB)) - 1/(1 + 𝑒 - (α + βLB))
Where
      IB = Initial bid
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      HB = Higher bid following 'Yes' response to the ﬁrst bid
      LB = Lower bid following 'No' response to the ﬁrst bid
      The calculation of the double-bounded log-likelihood for this set of responses is given as follows:
            (5)L𝐷𝐵 = ∑𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑖 + ∑𝑅𝑌𝑁𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑌𝑁𝑖 + ∑𝑅𝑁𝑌𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑁𝑌𝑖 + ∑𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑖
Where i = 1, …, 1,271 and Ri = response category of each respondent.
The mean WTP can be derived from the following formula:
                 (6)WTP * = α/|𝛽|  
In order to minimize the estimation error, the estimated parameter vector  and the estimated 𝛽
variance-covariance matrix  were used to determine the confidence interval, as in the logit model  and V α 𝛽 
have properties of random variables (Bocksta et al., 1987). Through multiple random replications, the 
empirical distribution of the WTP can be derived and the confidence interval of the WTP can be also 
calculated (Park et al., 1991). Then Referendum CVM program (Cooper, 1999) was introduced to measure 
the double-bounded logit regression and confidence interval estimates (Abbas et al., 2015).
6 Results and discussion
6.1 Statistical results of the WTP responses
Out of 1,280 fisher farmers who were surveyed, the valid responses from 1,271 fish farmers indicate 
that 796 of them, accounting for approximately 62.63% of the total sample, are willing to purchase 
insurance. The statistical results are presented in Table 4 (see Appendix).
When examining the WTP in different age groups the highest proportion can be observed from fish 
farmers aged below 20, while lowest proportion from those aged over 60. The WTP increases gradually 
with fish farmers' experience in aquaculture production and peaks when they have engaged in the sector 
for 16-25 years. 
The WTP increases as household size rises. About 85.5% households of more than 6 members are 
willing to purchase aquaculture insurance. Fish farmers' demand for insurance does not demonstrate a 
specific tendency as their income increases. The household of less than one quarter in the labour force 
reveals the highest willingness to pay at 94.7% and has a monotonic decreasing relationship with the 
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
15
WTP.12
The highest proportion of the WTP can be also identified from the group in which landholding per 
member of household is 1-3 acres. Those with an annual average loss under CNY2,000 and more than 
CNY6,000 demonstrate the lowest and highest proportion of the WTP for insurance, respectively.
The data also show that the WTP has a positive correlation with fish farmers' education level. It is 
found that 935 fish farmers know about aquaculture insurance and 805 fish farmers have heard of other 
types of commercial insurance.
Table 5 (see Appendix) presents the descriptive statistics of the WTP responses. It is obvious to note 
that the respondents with higher education level and insurance awareness responded positively to both 
initial and follow-up higher bids. Meanwhile, the respondents who accepted both bids own much more 
land per person and suffer greater annual loss than those who declined both bids. Household size also 
exhibits a positive correlation with the WTP responses, while the proportion of household members in 
labour force indicates a negative correlation. The older fish farmers with more farming experience are 
more likely to decline both bids. A bit surprisingly, those who tend to accept both bids are the ones who 
have the lowest average annual income.
6.2 Results of regression
 The regression results are given in Table 3. It is noted that all of the variables demonstrate a 
significant correlation with the WTP, which is not in line with the results of previous studies (Hill et al., 
2013; Khan et al., 2013). The results have revealed that the majority of fish farmers respond positively to 
the bids, and the negative coefficient of the bid value indicates that a lower price would be more affordable. 
The mean WTP for aquaculture insurance is calculated at CNY579 per household, which represents 1.5% 
of mean annual household income. This estimation provides valuable information for insurance companies 
when setting premiums.
(Insert Table 3 here)
Education level and annual average loss are found to have a positive effect on the WTP, which 
implies better educated fish farmers and those who have suffered serious losses are more likely to purchase 
insurance. The same result was also found by Akter (2009). It is also notable from the regression results 
that awareness towards insurance has a positive effect on the WTP and the coefficients for these two 
12 Partnerships or employed labourers are also included in manpower to guarantee the accuracy of the data.
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variables present fairly significant values. This is a similar result to that of Shields (2015). Different from 
previous studies in disaster insurance or agriculture insurance, household size imposes a positive effect on 
the WTP. This is because a larger household normally operates on a bigger scale and owns larger 
aquaculture lands, therefore, has a stronger desire to purchase aquaculture insurance to cover relatively 
high potential risks. Furthermore, there exist complicated interactions between education, household size 
and farming experience. More education can make fish farmers more knowledgeable. A larger household 
means there are more members in a family who can bring back more information about various methods of 
risk management, which strengthens their WTP. It is verified that the more educated younger fish farmers 
rely more on commercial insurance as a practical mechanism against risks. Moreover, the more serious 
loss of household assets caused by previous natural disaster can lead to a higher WTP. Thus, both financial 
loss and education can be attributed to higher WTP.
However, age, farming experience and proportion of household members in labour force all have a 
negative effect on the WTP. The statistics illustrate that older fish farmers with longer farming experience 
are more reluctant to join insurance schemes, as most of them know little about financial options against 
disasters and risks. If the proportion of household members in labour force increases due to more members 
in the household joining in non-fishery sector, the household can receive income elsewhere and become 
financially capable of coping with risks in the fishery sector, which adversely affect their WTP for 
aquaculture insurance. The situation can be even worse if the increase of the proportion of household 
members in labour force is a result of more members in the household joining in fishery sector. Because 
the higher proportion of the household engaging in fishing activities often implies a lower education level 
of the household (Sun et al., 2010; Wang, 2011; Guo and Gao, 2014), thus it further reduces fish farmers' 
WTP for insurance. It is reconfirmed that income plays a negative role in decision making of insurance 
adoption, i.e. higher income does not predict a higher WTP. Furthermore, increased farming experience 
and income reduce the likelihood of accepting a higher premium bid. It is easier for those who have strong 
capital strength, high credit score and good production capability to acquire financial assistance from 
banks and governments, which consequently reduces their demand for aquaculture insurance. This finding 
provides particularly useful insight for making policies and designing aquaculture insurance cooperation 
mechanism in China.
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7 Conclusions and policy implications
Despite of the remarkable development and promising future growth potential, China's fishery sector 
has been confronted with a relatively low penetration of insurance. There has been a growing concern with 
poor adoption of fishery insurance, in particular aquaculture insurance, in China and some studies have 
attempted to examine the causes behind the situation. However, it is still not clear what factors are 
associated with fish farmers' decision on adoption of aquaculture insurance in China. To find the answer to 
the question, this study collected data from a survey of 1,280 fish farmers in three coastal cities in 
Shandong province, i.e. Qingdao, Yantai and Weihai. Moreover, a double-bounded dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation method (DB DCCVM) was adopted to estimate fish farmers' WTP, which provides 
valuable information for insurance companies and policy makers. 
All the variables exhibit statistically significant but different effects on the WTP. Some factors have a 
positive effect, such as household size, education, landholding per member of household, annual average 
loss, and level of awareness towards insurance. But other factors have a negative effect such as age, 
farming experience, average annual household income and proportion of household members in labour 
force. Older people with more farming experience are more likely to have a lower education level, which 
makes them ignorant of insurance. The landholding per member of household and annual average loss of 
household directly reflect the degree of risk exposure and are the key drive for fish farmers to purchase 
aquaculture insurance. 
A striking finding is that income, a key factor determining fish farmers' affordability for insurance, has 
an unexpectedly negative effect on the WTP for aquaculture insurance. It can be explained that higher 
income approves a higher credit score, which enables those fish farmers to access to various financial 
resources to meet their need for risk diversification and compensation for loss. In addition, moral hazard is 
particularly a problem in the insurance market and consequently those with high income and low risk can 
be easily crowded out by those with low income and high risk. Without any doubt, increasing subsidies 
and reducing premiums can be appealing to both higher- and lower-income groups to participate in 
insurance programs. However, what concerns those of higher-income is whether aquaculture insurance can 
meet their diversified need, i.e. to provide more risk management channels and options for loss 
compensation as well as credit financing and guarantee. 
Fishery production in China has been less industrialized and thus operated in a labor-intensive model. 
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Fish farmers would prefer to improve income by simply increasing labor force to boost output, which 
seems the easiest and cheapest way to achieve their goals, rather than to purchase insurance to avoid risks 
to secure income. Besides, when choosing an insurance product, fish farmers care more about whether the 
service can provide sufficient protection against risks at affordable prices. The results of the survey have 
confirmed that hypothesis 3 and 4 provide a sound explanation for why China's aquaculture insurance has 
had such a poor performance from fish farmers' perspective, i.e. inadequate governments' financial 
subsidies and difficulty of assessing the insurability of various risks due to dispersed small scale 
production. 
To encourage fish farmers' participation, the coverage of aquaculture insurance should be extended to 
mariculture and marine processing as well as recreation fishing sectors, so as to meet diverse needs from a 
wider fishing community. In addition, financial support for aquaculture insurance provided by the 
government should be divided into supply-side and demand-side subsidies. Supply-side subsidy would 
help to fill the gap between operating cost and premium revenue of insurance companies, and thus 
incentivize more commercial insurance companies to enter the market. Demand-side subsidy would 
provide income support to motivate fish farmers' participation in aquaculture insurance. Although 
increasing the amount of the subsidies can be effective to increase motivation on both sides (Abbas et al., 
2015; Khan et al., 2013; Zheng and Wang, 2015), it is more useful to set discriminated premiums based on 
risk levels as well as fish farmers' financial status and credit score. This can effectively reduce the risk of 
adverse selection in the market and improve fish farmers' affordability for aquaculture insurance and bring 
a relatively high degree protection to those who have a lower risk level. Besides, policymakers should put 
effort into raising awareness and improving education by spreading the word about the importance of 
having insurance through various channels (Teweldemedhin and Kafidii, 2009). Insurance companies are 
advised to be more active in using the Internet and social media to promote their insurance products as 
well as develop social awareness of insurance in particular in rural areas where fish farmers need to be 
educated to appreciate the benefits of having insurance.
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Figure 1 Map of China and the study area
Table 2
Bid amount
No. Initial bid Following higher bid Following lower bid
1 50 100 25
2 150 300 125
3 250 500 225
4 350 700 325
5 450 900 425
Table 3
The regression results
Independent variables Coefficient S.E. Sig.
Age -0.271 0.027 0.018*
Exp -0.135 0.082 0.099**
Size 0.128 0.077 0.098**
Pro -0.820 0.402 0.041*
Inc -0.054 0.027 0.044*
Land 0.047 0.313 0.076**
Loss 0.497 0.118 0.000*
Edu 0.750 0.173 0.000*
AIn 0.788 0.174 0.000*
CIn 0.302 0.164 0.065**
C 0.536 0.538 0.319
Bid -0.041 0.213 0.027*
Willingness to pay 579 Confidence interval 95% 559.25-604.08
*Significant at 5%;**Significant at 10% .
Table 4
Statistics of the variables
Variables Categories Respondents
Pro. showing 
WTP for 
aquaculture 
insurance
Expected sign 
of the 
coefficient
<20 6 0.833
21-30 175 0.783
31-40 353 0.79
41-50 431 0.777
51-60 237 0.781
Age (year)
＞60 71 0.69
-
0-5 198 0.768
6-15 435 0.791
16-25 330 0.812
Personal 
variables
Farming 
experience (year)
≥25 294 0.721
- 
1 27 0.852
2 127 0.724
3 401 0.746
4 400 0.793
5 204 0.794
Household size
≥6 117 0.855
-
0-1/4 19 0.947
1/4-1/2 352 0.827
1/2-3/4 469 0.783
Proportion of 
household 
members 
in labour force 3/4-1 387 0.705
+
＜10000 111 0.766
10000-40000 720 0.792
40000-70000 350 0.771
70000-100000 75 0.733
Social 
variables
Average annual 
household income 
(CNY)
＞100000 15 0.8
+
0-0.5 165 0.63
0.5-1 323 0.793
1-3 607 0.817
3-10 142 0.775
Landholding per 
member of 
household (Acres)
＞10 39 0.718
+
0-2000 546 0.72
2000-4000 536 0.826
4000-6000 153 0.83
Risk 
variables
Average annual 
loss of household 
(CNY)
＞6000 14 0.929
+
Below primary(<3) 69 0.725
Primary(3-6) 149 0.745
Junior(6-9) 579 0.765
Senior(9-12) 421 0.847
Undergraduate(12-16) 45 0.943
Discrete 
education level of 
the household 
held (year)
Postgraduates and 
above(>16) 2 1
+
Yes 935 0.83
Attitude 
variables
Awareness 
towards 
aquaculture No 339 0.634
+
insurance (%)
Yes 805 0.825Awareness 
towards other 
commercial 
insurance (%)
No 458 0.694
+
Table 5
Breakup of variables according to WTP responses
Variables YY YN NY NN Overall sample
Age 17.3 46.7 62.9 68.1 42.3
Farming experience (Exp) 2.32 11.4 17.02 27.02 17.07
Household size (Size) 5.82 3.56 2.4 1.6 3.8
Proportion of household members
in labour force (Pro)
0.11 0.5 0.74 0.82 0.60
Average annual household income (Inc) 8325.11 23419.33 87633.41 112400.9 36472.90
Landholding per member of household (Land) 6.81 1.34 1.1 0.31 2.27
Average annual loss of household (Loss) 8214.15 6099.08 3134.56 1321.4 2402.99
Discrete education level of the household held (Edu) 9.2 6.72 5.8 3.25 9.04
Awareness towards aquaculture insurance (AIn) 77.78 51.04 41.13 32 73.45
Awareness towards other commercial insurance (CIn) 77.08 47.32 35.49 29.50 63.23
Response rate to WTP (%) 36.6 22.9 19.32 21.18 100
Table 1  
Main products of fishery insurance in China
Insurance 
types Name of products Insurer and coverage
"Anxin Escort Shield" 
fishing boat 
comprehensive insurance 
(AAIC, not dated)
Provided by Shanghai Anxin Agricultural Insurance Co. Ltd.
Covers damage to the hull and crew caused by natural disasters and accidents on fishing 
boats.
Nansha fishing boat 
foreign mutual insurance 
(CFMI, 2016)
Provided by China Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers full and partial loss of fishing vessels; loss of abandoned fishing gear so as to 
avoid being arrested by foreign military police; loss of machinery, equipment and 
others certificated on the hull to avoid clashes with foreign military police and 
collisions with other ships; salvage or salvage fees that are deemed necessary and 
reasonable for rescue or relief measures to prevent or reduce damage.
The premium rate is determined by the insurer based on the quality and age of the 
vessels etc.
Fishing boat mutual 
insurance (CFMI, 2016)
Provided by China Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers loss of the hull and the equipment on board caused by wind, natural disasters, 
floods, earthquake, tsunamis, lightning strikes, landslides, debris flows, ice disasters, 
fires, explosions, collisions, or missing in the sea for more than two months.
The premium rate is determined by the insurer based on the quality and age of the 
vessels and etc.
Fishing boat mutual 
insurance of Hainan 
(CFMI, 2016)
Same as the above but only provided in Hainan province.
The premium rate ranges from 0.7 to 3.05 according to the material, age, power of the 
hull.
Fishing vessel 
insurance
Fishing boat commercial 
insurance (CNTAIPING, 
not dated)
Provided by the China Ping An Insurance (Group) Company Ltd., China Pacific 
Insurance (Group) Co. Ltd., China Continent Insurance and other state-owned property 
insurance companies.
Covers the total or partial loss of fishing vessels caused by natural disasters or accidents 
as well as general salvage, and the navigation area is limited to that specified in the 
insurance policy.
The premium rate is determined by the insurer according to the quality and age of the 
vessels and etc.
Personal safety mutual 
insurance (CFMI, 2016)
Provided by China Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers accidental death or accidental disability of policy-holders engaging in fishery 
production or serving fishery production.
The actual premium varies as different provinces and cities have different premium 
subsidies.
Personal accident 
insurance at sea (Hainan 
Province) (CFMI, 2016)
Almost the same as the above, but only provided in Hainan Province.
Employers' liability 
mutual insurance (CFMI, 
2016)
Provided by China Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers general employer's liability insurance and compensates for accidental death or 
disability of employees engaging in fishery production or serving fishery production.
The premium rate ranges from 10% to 100% according to the damage and is negotiated 
between the insured and the CFMI.
Life insurance
Employers' foreign 
mutual liability insurance 
(Nansha) (CFMI, 2016)
Provided by China Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers financial loss as well as death or disability of employees working on fishing 
vessels in the traditional waters of the Nansha Islands in acts of violence by foreign 
military police (gun) strikes, arrests, and etc.
The indemnity is determined by the insured and the association, and the premium is 
equal to the indemnity multiplied by the premium rate, which varies from 5% to 100% 
according to the disability level.
"Safe to Fortis" 
aquaculture insurance 
(AAIC, not dated)
Provided by Shanghai Anxin Agricultural Insurance Co., Ltd. for fish farmers or 
agricultural entities engaging in river crab aquaculture in Shanghai, Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu only.
Covers loss of crabs and the gear destroyed or inundated by flood during the coverage 
period.Aquaculture insurance
Aquaculture insurance 
(GAPI, not dated)
Provided by the Groupama-AVIC Property Insurance Co., Ltd.
Covers fish loss caused by infection, major diseases, natural disasters, accidents, water 
pollution and floating heads to fish farmers and aquaculture companies. The insurance 
premium is negotiated between the applicant and the insurer with reference to the 
species and age of the fish.
The subsidy takes up to 50% to 60% of the premium, provided by the municipal and 
county government in Jilin, Sichuan, Shanxi (山西) and Shanxi (陕西).
Aquaculture mutual 
insurance (ZJOAF, 2017)
Provided by Zhejiang Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers loss of designated crabs, shellfish, algae, etc. caused by natural disasters, 
sudden diseases, and so on.
The premium ranges from CNY32 to 100 per CNY1,000 insured value.
Aquaculture insurance 
(GYNYBX, not dated)
Provided by Guo Yuan Agriculture Insurance Co., Ltd.
Covers loss caused by natural disasters, aquatic hypoxia for designated fresh water fish 
in Anhui province.
The premium ranges from CNY600 to 4,000 per 750-kilogram aquaculture production.
Typhoon index 
aquaculture insurance 
(FFMI, 2018)
Provided by Fujian Fisheries Mutual Insurance Association.
Covers loss caused by typhoon between 1st June and 31st October every year in Fujian 
province.
The premium rate ranges from 5.5% to 7%.
Source: compiled by authors.
